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Tensions between police practices and democratic 
principles are inevitable. Forces inherent in the 
operation of a police force-its authoritarian structure 
and outlook, its zeal to do a difficult and sometimes 
dangerous job, its loss of contact with the people who 
make up the community-press insistently toward 
arbitrary, abusive, sometimes inhuman, conduct in 
law enforcement. One of the chief purposes of the 
Bill of Rights, of course, is to interpose legal safeguards 
against improper police action. The extent to which 
police practices are kept under control through en-
forcement of these constitutional principles is an 
important measure of the success achieved by a 
society in realizing its democratic goals. Hence the 
application of the Bill of Rights to the operations of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a national police 
force, is of vital concern to the citizens of this country. 
There are two main sets of problems for a dem-
ocratic society in controlling the operations of its 
police. One relates to specific police methods and 
procedures. Protection of the citizen against arbitrary 
arrest, illegal detention, official brutality, improper 
interrogation, and similar unjust or inhuman treatment 
is essential to a civilized community. The Bill of 
Rights has been invoked most often in this context. 
The other set of problems raises broader issues and 
relates more to the substantive rights of the people 
than to the procedures of law enforcement. These 
questions concern the extent to which the operations 
of a police force tend to limit and confine the openness 
of the society, particularly as they inhibit its system 
of free expression. Of course, enforcement of the 
laws of the collective inevitably restricts, in some 
ways, the freedom of the individual. Yet the require-
ments of law and order need not eliminate all 
looseness, all spontaneity, all creative activity, all 
change in the society. The problem is to draw the line 
between order and vitality. And the police forces, 
who have a vested interest in the order side of the 
equation, are not necessarily disposed to the same 
solution as is contemplated by the Bill of Rights. 
In the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
the major current controversies with respect to 
methods and procedures concern the employment of 
electronic devices and the use of informers. At times, 
as in the Palmer raids and in national security in-
vestigations following World War 11, the Bureau has 
engaged in improper conduct in connection with 
arrests, interrogation, searches, and the like. But on 
the whole the policies and practices of the Bureau in 
these matters have probably been superior to those 
of most state and local police and have not raised 
novel problems under the Bill of Rights. Hence they 
will not be considered here in any detaiJ.1 
The primary focus of this article is thus on the 
second set of problems raised by police forces in a 
democratic society. To what degree has the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation affected the openness of 
American society, particularly its system for free 
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exchange of ideas? And, if that effect has been sup-
pressive, what remedies are available? The issues 
center around the role of the Bureau in protecting the 
"national security." Other law enforcement activities 
of the Bureau, which are many and important, are 
only of peripheral significance to the central problem 
here under consideration. 
I. The Operations of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 
It is first necessary to examine, albeit very briefly, 
the operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
in the area of "national security." Unfortunately it 
is not easy to obtain information about the real 
workings of the Bureau. Like all police organizations, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducts its 
business largely in secret. Even the Attorney General, 
who nominally controls the Bureau, is not privy to 
its internal affairs. No committee of Congress has 
probed the operations of the Bureau since a brief 
investigation of the Palmer raids by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in 1921. Only sporadically do 
the cases in court shed some light. Statements of 
persons whose lives are touched by the Bureau are 
available, and some accounts by former agents exist; 
both of these sources, however, are sometimes difficult 
to evaluate. Official reports and statements of the 
Bureau, of course, may be found in abundance; these 
are useful but limited. 
Only on two occasions has the veil which shrouds 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation been lifted. In 
1949, in the trial of Judith Coplon for espionage, the 
government was forced to produce 28 Bureau reports 
dealing with national security matters. These take up 
approximately 800 typewritten pages of the record. 2 
In 1971 a group calling itself the Citizens' Commis-
sion to Investigate the FBI, entered the Bureau's 
offices in Media, Pennsylvania, and carried off all or 
a large proportion of its files, about 800 altogether. 
Some of these files have been made available to 
newspapers and others.3 The Coplon reports and 
the Media documents afford an inside view, of some 
breadth and depth, into the operations of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. Together with the other 
sources, it is thus possible to obtain a reasonably 
realistic picture of the role of the Bureau in the 
national security field. 4 
A. Functions 
From a study of the available materials it is 
apparent that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
conceives its function primarily as constituting the 
first line of defense, and the major bulwark, against 
threats to the national security. It undertakes to 
man both the early warning system and the main 
barricades. Moreover, its view of the dangers to 
national security-dangers which it believes the 
government must combat at all costs-is a broad 
one. The Bureau is concerned not only with the 
possibility of espionage, sabotage, and the use of 
force or violence to effect political change. Its 
interests and activities extend to two other areas of 
major importance. One is the sphere of "loyalty", 
an area that encompasses the attitudes, beliefs, 
opinions and associations of individuals. While the 
Bureau's concern with loyalty is legally grounded in 
the Federal employee loyalty program, its operations 
tend to cover the loyalty of all citizens. The second 
sphere is that of "subversive activities." This area, 
vague in the extreme, extends far beyond acts of force 
or violence to militantly expressed opinions, organiza-
tional activities of radical groups, and any signs of 
potential dissidence or disruption. The concepts of 
"loyalty" and "subversive activities", as developed by 
the Bureau, carry it very far in the direction of 
viewing all militant or radical dissent as a threat to 
the national security. 
The result is that, in essence, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation conceives of itself as an instrument 
to prevent radical social change in America. This 
view, when implemented in practice, leads to three 
significant features of the Bureau's operation. 
First, throughout most of its history the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation has taken on the task not 
only of investigating specific violations of Federal 
laws, but gathering general intelligence in the 
"national security" field. At its inception in 1908, 
and for some years thereafter, the operations of the 
Bureau were limited to collecting evidence of 
violation of Federal statutes, the Mann Act in 
particular.5 But by the time of World War I the 
activities of the Bureau had branched out to include 
surveillance of radical groups such as the Socialists, 
Industrial Workers of the World, syndicalists, and 
the Non-Partisan League.6 In 1919 a General 
Intelligence Division was created in the Department 
of Justice, with J. Edgar Hoover as its head, to 
cooperate with the Bureau in collecting information 
with regard to the unrest and radicalism that then 
appeared to the government to be threatening 
the country. 7 Attorney General Stone, reorganizing 
the Bureau in 1924 and promoting Hoover to be 
its Director, cut back its operations to strictly law 
enforcement activities. 8 How long this state of affairs 
lasted is not entirely clear, but it is certain that the 
Bureau maintained a close watch over the Com-
munist Party in the late 1920's and early 1930's, 
and in 1934 made a general investigation of pro-Nazi 
organizations.9 In 1936, according to Hoover, 
President Roosevelt called him to the White House 
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and directed him "to have investigation made of the 
subversive activities in this country." 10 Hoover 
seized the opening with alacrity and has pursued that 
mission vigorously since then. In the 1950's the 
Bureau undertook the gathering of general intelli-
gence with respect to racist organizations, and in the 
1960's with respect to civil rights, racial, and peace 
groups. I I The Coplon and Media documents 
abundantly illustrate the breadth of the Bureau's 
surveillance since World War II. There can be little 
question, then, that the Bureau has for many decades 
assumed the function of collecting general intelli-
gence on all matters that could conceivably be 
relevant to its expandable concept of "national 
security." 
Second, when the Bureau addresses itself to the 
enforcement of specific Federal laws, it conceives its 
task to be one of collecting information which is 
relevant, not only to a violation that has already 
occurred or is about to occur, but to violations which 
might occur in the future. For example, among 
the Media documents is a memorandum dated 
February 26, 1968, in which the Special Agent in 
Charge urged all agents in the office to develop 
"racial informants" in ghetto areas, on the theory 
that "if a riot does occur, especially in Philadelphia, 
all Agents will be working on riot problems." One 
can hardly doubt, either, that the Bureau collected 
data on, and prepared lists of, persons who were 
considered subjects for incarceration under the 
Emergency Detention Act of 1950 in the event of 
an "Internal Security Emc;:rgency."I 2 Such a "pre-
ventive" approach to law enforcement leads to 
unlimited expansion of data collection, virtually all 
activity outside the conventional rounds of American 
politics becoming grist for the Bureau's mill. 13 
Thirdly, the Bureau's view of its function leads 
it beyond data collection and into political warfare. 
The pronouncements of J. Edgar Hoover, presumably 
based upon material collected by Bureau agents and 
made in his capacity as an expert on subversive 
activities, are intended to arouse government and 
public hostility against political groups disfavored by 
the Bureau. At another level of action, investigation 
turns into harassment. Thus, in another Media 
document, a Bureau newsletter, it is suggested to 
all agents that there be "more interviews with these 
subjects and hangers-on" since that "will enhance 
the paranoia endemic in these circles and will further 
serve to get the point across there is an FBI Agent 
behind every mailbox." Don Whitehead in his 
semi-official history of the Bureau sums up the point 
well when he says that "the FBI literally went to war 
against the Communist party."14 
Ultimately the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 
concept of its role comes down to the proposition 
that the Bureau is the general guardian of the national 
security and that it should seek to achieve its goals 
not merely through assisting the prosecuting au-
thorities in enforcement of the law through direct 
measures of its own. This has been clearly expressed 
by Hoover himself when he describes his mandate 
as being "to identify individuals working against 
the United States, determine their objectives and 
nullify their effectiveness."I5 
B. Ideology 
The basic ideology of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation-its concept of the dangers to national 
security and the way in which they must be com-
batted-has remained largely unchanged over the 
years. This is not surprising in as much as the Bureau 
has been dominated by a single individual, its 
Director, since 1924. Many observers have com-
mented upon these fundamental political assump-
tions underlying the operation of the Bureau, and 
it is only necessary to list them in summary form: 
(1) The Bureau tends to equate national security 
with preservation of the traditional American way 
of life, as understood by the most conservative 
Americans, in its most pristine form. Any serious 
disagreement with the principles underlying this way 
of life is likely to be viewed as "disloyalty", and any 
conduct which seeks substantial alteration of its 
institutions is viewed as "subversive." 
(2) The main danger to the American way of life 
(and hence to national security) comes from alien 
ideologies, primarily as espoused by the Communist 
Party, which is a powerful and diabolical force in the 
United States. Americans, if left to themselves, are 
liable to be seduced or deceived by these purveyors 
of false ideas, and those who propose or work 
toward serious change in the established order are 
giving aid and comfort to the enemy. 
(3) National security can be assured only by total 
vigifance. There is little room for play in the joints 
of the American system. To take another metaphor, 
every radical spark must be rubbed out ruthlessly, 
lest it start a conflagration. Hence, the interest in 
national security normally takes precedence over the 
risks of conflict inherent in the toleration of strong 
dissent. 
(4) National security will be achieved primarily 
through application of official coercion against those 
who threaten disruption. Hence emphasis is placed 
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upon enforcement of law and order rather than upon 
methods of relieving social discontent. 
(5) The appropriate limits on political opposi-
tion are determined by the nature of the ideas 
advanced and the moderation with which they are 
put forward. Freedom of expression does not include 
"license". 
(6) An individual who for any purpose associates 
with another individual or a group working against 
the American system is likely to have adopted, or is 
prepared to adopt, all the beliefs and actions of the 
other person or group. Hence association with 
"subversives" is itself "subversive". Furthermore, 
any organization is susceptible to influence and 
control by its most extreme members. 
(7) The policies and practices necessary for 
protection of the national security are not matters 
to be left to the ordinary "civilian" but require a 
professional organization of experts. That agency 
must be tightly organized, rigidly disciplined, and 
ready to give unquestioned obedience to the com-
mands of its chief. Criticism or dissent within the 
organization is not to be tolerated. The organization 
must operate in complete secrecy and must have 
absolute independence in the conduct of its investi-
gations and other activities. 
(8) Criticism from outside sources of the agency 
charged with protection of the national security is 
likely to be motivated by anti-American beliefs and 
to be "subversive". If the criticism is worthy of 
answer at all, it deserves utter condemnation. 
This listing of the preconceptions underlying the 
operation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is 
not meant to imply that the Bureau's actions are 
always rigidly controlled by these principles and that 
no other ideas or values find a place in the conduct 
of its affairs. The specific formulations, likewise, 
may perhaps be exaggerated. Nevertheless, one 
cannot come away from a study of the available 
material on the Bureau without a clear feeling that 
the above account gives a reasonably accurate 
impression of the world in which the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation lives. 
C. Scope of Operations 
The scope of the operation of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation is extensive and constantly expand-
ing. Its budget requests are seldom questioned and 
never reduced. They have steadily increased year by 
year. For the fiscal year 1971 the Bureau operated on 
a budget of $334,000,000 and employed 8482 
agents. 16 There were 59 major Bureau offices and 
500 resident agency offices. The work product is 
massive. In 1971 the Bureau had an estimated 
200,000,000 fingerprint cards in its files.17 Its 
Domestic Intelligence Division is reported to have 
50,000,000 index cards, and nearly 6,000,000 
investigative files. 18 New techniques of storage have 
made all this information more readily available. 
The proportion of Bureau resources devotec.t to 
national security matters is not precisely known. It has 
been estimated that the Bureau has 2000 agents in-
vestigating political activities.19 Other evidence on the 
point comes from a breakdown of the documents 
stolen from the Media office, as released by the 
Citizens Commission to Investigate the FBI. Of over 
800 files taken, the Commission stated, 40 per cent 
involved political surveillance. Of these, two related 
to right-wing organizations, ten to aliens, and the 
remainder to left-wing or liberal groups. The evidence 
is by no means conclusive. There can be small doubt, 
however, that a substantial proportion of the Bureau's 
enormous energies and manpower is devoted to 
watching over or influencing the political activities 
of American citizens. 
D. Subjects of Investigation 
What are the criteria by which the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, as guardian of the national security, 
determines when to collect information about a 
particular individual, organization or group? The 
precise answer is not known, as no standards have 
ever been made public by the Bureau. It is possible, 
however, to draw some conclusions from the facts 
which have come to light. 
Some subjects of Bureau inquiry are persons or 
organizations suspected of being in violation of 
Federal criminal or other statutes under the Bureau's 
jurisdiction. These laws cover a wide area where · 
political activity is taking place. Thus Federal statutes 
make it a crime to engage in espionage or some forms 
of sabotage. Federal anti-sedition laws, primarily the 
Smith Act, punish advocacy of force or violence to 
overthrow the government, or formation of an 
organization for that purpose. The Internal Security 
Act of 1950 provides for a listing of Communist-
Action, Communist-Front, and Communist-
Infiltrated organizations, as well as members of a 
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Communist-Action organization. Aliens are subject 
to deportation on certain political grounds. Recent 
Federal laws prohibit the crossing of state lines with 
the intent to blow up buildings, participate in or 
encourage a riot, or engage in similar activities. 
These and other statutes form a base from which the 
Bureau's investigative process begins. 
The Federal loyalty-security programs add 
another dimension to the Bureau's investigations in 
the national security field. Under the main loyalty-
security program no person may obtain or hold a 
Federal job unless his employment is "clearly con-
sistent with the interests of national security. "20 The 
program also calls for maintenance by the Attorney 
General of a list of organizations that are "totalitarian, 
Fascist, Communist, or subversive." Other programs, 
such as the industrial security program, cover 
millions of persons employed outside the government. 
All these provisions furnish the Bureau with a broad 
mandate to launch inquiries into areas of political 
conduct. 
From these foundations the Bureau investigations 
take off and a process of proliferation begins. Investi-
gation of an individual leads to investigation of his 
friends and associates, then to the organizations of 
which he is a member, and from there to the leader-
ship of the organizations. The duty to check on 
Communist Party members carries the Bureau on to 
checks of fellow travelers, "pseudo-liberals", 
"dupes", and the associates of any of these. A 
"non-subversive" organization may be deemed to 
need investigation in order to determine whether it 
has "subversive" members, or whether "extremists" 
come to its meetings. As J. Edgar Hoover describes 
the process, "We, of course, do not investigate labor 
unions ... We have, however, investigated in-
numerable instances of Communist infiltration into 
labor unions. " 21 The chain of inquiry which starts 
with searching out "loyalty" and "subversive 
activities" is an endless one. 
In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
does not necessarily start from the foundations sup-
plied by specific Federal statutes or the loyalty 
programs. As noted above, the Bureau conceives its 
function to include the collection of general political 
intelligence and preventive data on matters relating 
to national security. Under this view of the Bureau's 
authority there are even fewer limits on the kinds 
of individuals or organizations that become subject 
to Bureau scrutiny.22 
The full implications of the Bureau's theory of 
its investigative jurisdiction are revealed whenever 
the internal operations of the Bureau are exposed to 
public view. Thus the Coplon reports showed that the 
Bureau compiled a dossier on the actor Frederic 
March and his wife, Florence Eldridge, because they 
were reported to have participated in the activities 
of various organizations associated with the Henry 
Wallace movement. A music student was investigated 
because he visited the New Jersey headquarters of 
the Communist Party and talked with his mother 
there. Another person came under surveillance 
because he "was connected with some pro-Israel 
organization which was sending representatives to 
various parts of the world." A committee of the 
National Lawyers Guild, after a detailed study of the 
Coplon reports, summarized its findings in the fol-
lowing terms: 
It is, then, perfectly plain that, by and large, the FBI 
investigations described in the Coplon reports were at-
tempting to determine not what crimes the subject had 
committed, but what kind of a person he was with reference 
to his social, political and economic views, his personal 
~ssoci~tio.ns, and his organizational affiliations. The Coplon 
~nvest1gat10ns demonstrate that the FBI investigates persons 
m order to determine whether they have radical views and 
associations. 23 
The Media documents demonstrate that in recent 
years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has cast 
its net even more widely. One document is a lifetime 
profile of an anti-war activist who had committed 
no offense beyond a breach of the peace for which 
he was fined $5 in 1954.24 Another revealed an 
investigation being made of a student at the University 
of Maryland who had been "a constant source of 
agitation at the University for the past few years" 
and a leader in a demonstration which resulted in 
some arrests. J. Edgar Hoover himself ordered 
"discreet, preliminary inquiries ... into all BSUs 
[Black Student Unions] and similar organizations 
organized to project the demands of black students, 
which are not presently under investigation." Agents 
were ordered to prepare for the convention of the 
National Association of Black Students by having 
"logical [i.e. black] informants ... locate NABS chap-
ters and representatives" and by having "informants 
in a logical position to do so, attend the convention." 
A watch was kept on other black organizations, in-
cluding CORE, SCLC, the Black Coalition, National 
Black Economic Conference, and a settlement house. 
Indeed the Bureau was under general instructions 
that it was "essential" to develop "racial informants" 
in ghetto areas; their duties included visits to 
Afro-American type bookstores "for the purpose of 
determining if militant extremist literature is available 
therein and, if so, to identify the owners, operators, 
and clientele of such stores." Also included in the 
Media documents was a memorandum directing 
surveillance of the Conference of War Resisters, a 
pacifist group meeting at Haverford College, in order 
to determine whether "it will generate any anti-U.S. 
propaganda"; and a report on a peaceful demonstra-
tion in Philadelphia on chemical warfare. 
The scope of the Bureau's political surveillance 
appears also from other sources. Thus in the hearings 
on the Bureau's 1960 budget Hoover testified, "We 
now have 155 known, or suspected, Communist 
front and Communist-infiltrated organizations under 
investigation."25 By the hearings on the 1962 budget 
the number had increased to "some 200."26 In 
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April 1971 Senator Edmund S. Muskie revealed that 
the Bureau had conducted a "widespread sur-
veillance" of anti-pollution rallies held on Earth Day 
in 1970, including one at which the Senator himself 
had been a speaker.27 Attorney General Mitchell 
defended the surveillance on the ground that the 
Bureau had advance information (the source not 
disclosed) that persons with records of violence were 
planning to attend.28 Finally, the Bureau's inquiries 
into political affairs carry even into such sensitive 
areas as the campus.29 
It is fair to conclude from the above that the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation's interest and 
attention extends to virtually all persons politically 
active who do not operate within the confines of the 
two major parties, to all organizations who take a 
militant or strong dissenting position, to all groups 
which are considered by the Bureau potentially 
disruptive, and to all persons associated with these. 
The extent to which the Bureau's surveillance 
machinery is actually put into operation depends, of 
course, upon its available resources and its order 
of priorities. But there is no doubt that the Bureau 
does amass political intelligence throughout a wide 
sector of its field of interest. 
E. Kinds of Information Collected 
The information collected by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation in its national security investiga-
tions, and stored in its files or incorporated into its 
reports, covers an extraordinarily broad spectrum of 
human conduct. It includes data on most aspects of 
the public life and many aspects of the private life 
of the individual under scrutiny. It deals with 
virtually every feature of organizational existence. 
One is hard put to discern any criteria of relevancy. 
Of course, any investigation by its very nature 
probes into outlying areas, the investigators not 
knowing in advance what may tum up. And any 
investigating agency is likely to acquire or be fur-
nished with large amounts of raw material which 
prove to be of no use to it. But the Bureau's investiga-
tions-no doubt in part due to the use of informers, 
wiretapping and bugging, and in part because the 
inquiry delves into beliefs, attitudes and opinions-
seem to extend far beyond normal limits. 
The Coplon documents abound in examples of the 
type of data the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
considers relevant, or at least puts into its reports. 
The first six items on a longer list compiled by the 
National Lawyers Guild Committee were as follows: 
Being affiliated with the Progressive Party [Henry Wallace 
Party]. 
Admiring the military feats of the Russian Army during 
World War II. 
Acting (in 1945) in a skit about the battles of Leningrad 
and Stalingrad. 
Opposing the Committee on Un-American Activities. 
Writing a master's thesis on the New Deal in New Zealand. 
Attending a rally against the Mundt bill. 30 
The Media papers contain other illustrations. The 
investigation of the anti-war activist, mentioned above, 
included the following information: 
Statements from unnamed informants who worked with 
him at the Bellevue Medical Center in New York City in 
1957, in which he was "described as 'queer fish', 'screwball', 
'smarty pants'." 
A report that he volunteered for risky research experiments 
and was described by the psychiatrist who did the work as 
"altruistic, sincere, believer in God, but not in conventional 
religion." 
Reports from police intelligence in Haverford, Pa., of the 
distribution of antiwar leaflets in 1968. 
A report of his presence at a rally at which the war in 
Vietnam was called "unconstitutional" and "illegal." 
References to newspaper clippings on letterheads of anti-war 
organizations' stationery that indicate connections with 
antiwar and antidraft groups.31 
Similarly an investigation of a philosophy professor 
at Swarthmore records such information as that he 
invited controversial speakers to the campus without 
permission, was visited by "hippie types", and had 
printing equipment in his garage. We also learn from 
the Media documents the names of all identifiable 
persons at meetings of a black church group, that a 
lay brother at Villanova Monastery reported that a 
Villanova University priest had borrowed a monastery 
car, and that a student under surveillance had 
majored in Greek. 
Materials from other sources confirm that these 
samples of the type of data collected by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation are not untypical of its 
operations. a2 Once the eye of the Bureau fastens on 
a particular individual or organization there is 
virtually no limit to where the inquiry may carry. 
The process is by nature Orwellian. 
F. Methods 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation utilizes the 
full panoply of detection techniques in conducting 
investigations. Its agents make inquiries of friends, 
acquaintances, neighbors, employers, landlords, 
bankers, schools, and any other person or institution 
likely to have information about the subject. The time 
span of the investigation often reaches into family 
background and early childhood history. Information 
is obtained not only through interrogation of poten-
tially knowledgeable persons but through photograph~ 
ing, tailing, wiretapping, bugging, placing informers 
and infiltrators, searching premises, observing mail, 
inspecting trashcans, clipping newspapers, and many 
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other devices. Quantities of raw data are stored in 
dossiers and reports are prepared summarizing the 
material deemed most relevant.33 
All this is not necessarily different from the methods 
used by other police forces or private detective 
agencies. Yet it is important to keep in mind.that 
we are concerned here with investigations into politi-
cal conduct. In that context two considerations take 
on special significance. 
First, Federal Bureau of Investigation practices, 
like those of any other police force, can easily slip 
into patently unconstitutional conduct. As mentioned 
above, the Bureau's record on this is better than most 
but it is not beyond reproach. Prior to the reor-
ganization of the Bureau in 1924 illegal practices 
were widespread. 34 Subsequently, the Coplon reports 
disclose that in the post World War II period the 
Bureau engaged not only in extensive wiretapping 
(then illegal) but on occasion intercepted and opened 
mail and, at least in three cases, entered private 
homes and searched personal effects without a 
warrant.35 The very existence of an elaborate inves-
tigatory -apparatus makes such practices quite 
possible, though they can rarely be documented.36 
Second, the Bureau's investigations cannot be 
viewed as the mere gathering and storage of data. The 
investigatory process itself affects attitudes, careers, 
and lives in crucial ways. One of the Media documents 
affords a graphic picture of what it is like to be the 
subject of a Bureau investigation. The Swarthmore 
philosophy professor, referred to previously, was being 
checked on the possibility that it might lead to the 
apprehension of two women alleged to have partici-
pated in a bank robbery and murder engineered by a 
radical political group. The Bureau's agents made 
contact with the college security officer, a neighbor, 
the switchboard operator, the local chief of police 
who lived two doors away, and the postmaster, all of 
whom gave information and promised to keep the 
professor, his telephone calls, his mail, and his other 
doings under close surveillance. This example is 
noted, not because the particular investigation was 
necessarily illegitimate, but to illustrate that the side 
effects of a Bureau investigation have to be reckoned 
with. 
G. Activities Beyond the Collection of Data 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation constantly 
asserts that its sole function is to collect information 
and pass it on to other government officials, who 
draw all conclusions from the raw data and make all 
decisions regarding further action. Plainly the Bureau 
underestimates its role even as a gatherer of infor-
mation; obviously it must determine what to collect, 
evaluate what it receives, and pass on what it considers 
relevant. However that may be, to view the Bureau 
as merely a data-collection agency would be wholly 
unrealistic. As an integral part of its operations the 
Bureau engages in various activities which have far-
reaching effects upon American political life. 
1. Public Relations 
The public relations system of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation is generally regarded as second to 
none in the Federal government, and perhaps in the 
nation. Focus of interest has usually been upon its 
role in building an image of the Director. This is a 
disturbing problem: creating a national hero out of 
the head of the security police raises troublesome 
questions about American democracy. But other 
features of Bureau publicity are even more significant. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, primarily 
through its Director, has vigorously spread its ideology 
throughout the country in speeches, statements, re-
ports, articles, interviews, motion pictures, radio and 
television programs, and other ways. 37 As noted 
above, by and large this ideology has consisted of a 
primitive anti-Communism, a messianic dedication to 
the "American way of life", a hard-nosed view of 
law and order, and similar features. Moreover, the 
Bureau has gone even further in attempting to sell its 
point of view to the American public. The Media 
documents reveal that all agents were sent copies of an 
article from Barron's entitled "Campus or Battle-
ground?", subtitled "Columbia Is A Warning To All 
American Universities," and urged to furnish the re-
prints "to educators and administrators who are 
established sources." The covering memorandum 
went on: "It may be mailed anonymously to college 
educators who have shown reluctance to take decisive 
action against the 'New Left'. Positive results or com-
ments by recipients should be furnished to the 
Bureau." How much of this sort of propaganda the 
Bureau undertakes has not been disclosed. 
One facet of the Bureau's public relations deserves 
particular notice. Much of the Bureau's publicity 
seems intended to arouse fears and anxieties in the 
public mind about our national security, or at least 
has had that effect. Events have not borne out the 
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dire predictions, and skeptics have frequently sug-
gested that the Bureau's major purpose has been to 
assure an increase in appropriations. Whether or not 
this be the design the result has been that a rational 
approach to security questions has been made difficult 
and public attention turned away from the real 
problems to be solved. All in all the efforts expended 
by the Bureau in its public relations have had a 
pervading and important influence upon American 
public opinion. 
2. Disclosures and Leakage 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation claims that the 
materials in its files are held in strict secrecy and are 
never revealed to any person other than a government 
official having need for them in connection with law 
enforcement or similar duties. There is abundant and 
convincing evidence, however, that substantial 
amounts of data from the Bureau's files ultimately 
become public through disclosure or leakage, and 
that the possibility of such exposure is ever present. 
Without attempting an exhaustive survey of the 
matter, it is sufficient to note the following facts. 
First, J. Edgar Hoover himself quoted previously 
unpublished material from Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation files in his book Masters of Deceit. 3 s 
Again, in 1954 Attorney General Brownell read 
material from the Bureau files in making an attack on 
the previous Democratic administration for continuing 
Harry Dexter White in government employment.:19 
President Truman followed a general policy of refusing 
to disclose Bureau files but in some cases allowed 
individual Congressmen to see them at the White 
House. 40 President Eisenhower adhered to the general 
policy of non-disclosure but conceded that summaries 
and factual information from Bureau files had been 
turned over to Congressional Committees. 41 Vice 
President Nixon, in October 1954, disclosed extensive 
material from Burean files in an attack upon Rep. 
Robert L. Condon of California. 4 2 
Second, over the years a steady volume of infor-
mation has found its way from Federal Bureau of 
Investigation files to various Congressional commit-
tees investigating "subversive activities". Senator 
Joseph McCarthy's Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations obtained substantial amounts of ma-
terial from Bureau sources, apparently by way of 
military intelligence. 4H On one occasion Robert 
Morris, counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on In-
ternal Security, read into the record extracts from the 
loyalty files of Solomon Adler, a former Treasury 
official. 44 Likewise in the Senate debate over the 
confirmation of Charles E. Bohlen to be Ambassador 
to Russia, Senator Gillette described several items of 
information which had come from the Bureau by way 
of Secretary of State Dulles.45 There is substantial 
evidence, also, that the House Committee on Un-
American Activities continuously received material 
originating in Bureau files. 46 
Third, vast quantities of information are transmitted 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to various 
government agencies under the loyalty-security 
programs or simply by way of informing the agency 
of public opposition to its programs or practices. 47 
The official policy is to keep such reports confidential 
but in the ordinary course of business numerous 
persons read them or have access to them. Leaks from 
this source are inevitable. 
Fourth, state legislative committees investigating 
"subversion" also seem to have obtained information 
which originated in Federal Bureau of Investigation 
files. 4s 
Fifth, it has recently been disclosed that a private 
collection of files on 125,000 alleged "subversive" 
persons and organizations, maintained by former 
Major General Ralph H. Van Deman (one time head 
of Army Intelligence) and his wife contained massive 
materials from Federal Bureau of Investigation files. 
The New York Times reported: "The heart of the 
Van Deman files, according to military sources who 
have seen them, comprises confidential intelligence 
reports that General Van Deman obtained regularly 
from Army and Navy intelligence and from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation."49 · 
Sixth, it has been reliably reported from numerous 
sources that material on Martin Luther King, Jr., 
with whom J. Edgar Hoover was then engaged in 
controversy, was leaked from Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation files to the press. 50 Also, the Department 
of Justice admitted that damaging material from the 
Bureau files on Mayor Alioto had been given to Look 
Magazine. 51 
From this and other evidence it would seem plain 
that, whether for reasons of motivation, pressure, or 
bureaucratic looseness, substantial disclosures and 
leaks of confidential material from Federal Bureau 
of Investigation files do and always will occur. 
3. Harassment 
The dynamics of any police force press toward a 
mode of operation that goes beyond legitimate police 
activity and ends in harassment. Given the Federal 
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Bureau of Investigation ideology, one might ex~ect 
that institution to exhibit these tendencies especially 
in its work in national security. Conceiving its mission 
to be that of carrying on a holy war against a diabolical 
foe, the Bureau, or the more zealous parts of it, 
might easily be tempted to carry the st~uggle _beyond 
the collection of data to more affirmative action. 
There is no doubt that this has occurred. 
On occasion Director Hoover has himself led his 
forces in this kind of warfare. Thus recently Hoover, 
before any indictment had been returned, accused the 
Berrigan brothers of participating in a plot to kidnap 
a government official and blow up underground elec-
trical conduits and steam pipes in Washington. 52 
Earlier Hoover had launched a personal attack upon 
Martin Luther King, Jr., saying, "I consider King to 
be the most notorious liar in this country."53 It is true 
that King had criticized the Bureau for inadequate 
enforcement of the Federal civil rights laws in the 
South, but the retaliation went far beyond a reasonable 
answer to reasonable criticism. The Hoover attack, 
as noted above, was followed up by disclosures to the 
press of material derogatory to King from Bureau files. 
Other examples of Federal Bureau of Investigation 
harassment from the top have come to light. Thus 
at one time a Federal judge severely rebuked Hoover 
for issuing statements highly prejudicial to a Smith 
Act defendant on the eve of his trial. 54 More recently 
Senator McGovern presented evidence that Hoover 
had attempted to get a TWA pilot, who had criticized 
the Bureau for its handling of a hijacking episode, 
discharged by informing his employer that the pilot 
had "experienced some personal difficulty in the Air 
Force prior to his employment by TW A."55 . 
At lower levels of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation harassment has taken place in the form of 
photographing persons participating in peaceful 
demonstrations, obvious presence of agents at or 
outside meetings, open shadowing, recording of license 
plates of cars, unnecessary interviews, and other 
forms of ostentatious surveillance. 56 On other oc-
casions excessive or ill-conceived use of informers or 
infiltration has had the same effect. 57 That these forms 
of harassment are widespread is evident from the 
Bureau newsletter, already quoted, which urged agents 
to engage in activities which would "enhance the 
paranoia" of those under investigation and "serve 
to get the point across there is an FBI agent behind 
every mailbox." 
4. Political Influence 
A predisposition to wield political influence inheres 
in all security police forces. In the case of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation this tendency is again en-
hanced by the basic attitudes and ideology which 
dominate the organization. War against a political 
movement inevitably must be fought on political levels. 
Moreover, an underlying distrust of the political 
reliability of the American people-a fear that they 
are easily misled by radical political propaganda-
makes it difficult for the guardians of the national 
security to remain aloof from the political scene. One 
would anticipate, therefore, that the Bureau is.heavily 
involved in politics, and it is. The Bureau officially 
takes the position, of course, that it does not engage 
in any kind of political activity, and the myth of 
J. Edgar Hoover is that he is "above politics." So far 
as narrow partisan politics are concerned, this is 
largely true. But in a broader sense the Bureau is an 
intensely political organization. 
A large part of the political influence of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation emanates from its general 
public relations activities described above. But the 
Bureau also exerts a much more specific kind of 
political impact. For example, in the midst of the 
controversy surrounding Senator Joseph McCarthy, 
Hoover publicly placed himself in the McCarthy camp, 
defending him against his critics and giving him a 
personal blessing: "I've come to know him well, 
officially and personally. I view him as a friend and 
believe he so views me."58 On another occasion when 
George McGovern was running for the Senate against 
Senator Karl Mundt in South Dakota, Hoover made 
public a letter praising Mundt's anti-Communist 
activities.59 Later, when Senator Eugene McCarthy 
was campaigning for President and said Hoover 
had become too independent and should be replaced, 
Hoover wrote in the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Bulletin: "All Americans should view with serious 
concern the announced intentions and threats by a 
political candidate, if elected, to take over an~ 
revamp the F.B.I. to suit his own personal whims and 
desires. "OO Other forms of political influence are 
exerted behind the scenes.01 
Many Washington observers believe that a major 
source of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's politi-
cal power lies in the fact that the Bureau file~ contain 
information about members of Congress which would 
be embarrassing (or worse) if disclosed. Other gov-
ernment officials are subject to the same pressures. As 
the New York Times reported recently: "Sophisticated 
lawyers in government and on its fringe contend that 
many officeholders believe that the Bureau has files 
with material on the personal peccadilloes of people 
in the government and were-justifiably or not-
afraid of being blackmailed."n2 The Bureau vehe-
mently denies that investigation of Congressmen "as 
such" are made, or that special dossiers on government 
officials are kept. The truth of the situation is not 
fully known. But it is clear that many legislators and 
executive officials are sufficiently concerned by the 
possible existence of Bureau dossiers on them that 
their political conduct is affected. 63 
Taken as a whole, there can be no doubt that the 
political influence of the Federal Bureau of Investi_ga-
tion is enormous. It is equally clear that the potential 
power of such an organization is even greater. 
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5. Relations With State and Local Police 
Authorities 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has established 
close relations with state and local police authorities. 
It runs a National Academy for training police; it 
maintains a National Crime Information Center for 
the collection and dissemination of data; it operates 
crime laboratories which assist state and local author-
ities; it exchanges information; and generally it 
maintains a close liaison. At times there has been some 
friction between the Bureau and state or local police, 
largely in the case of big city police departments. But 
in general the relations are good. This is particularly 
true in the national security field. As Frank Donner 
has pointed out, working relationships are so close 
in this area that "local and national intelligence 
agencies are beginning to coalesce into an 'intelligence 
community' ".64 Indeed there is evidence that the 
Bureau has undertaken the task of developing counter-
insurgency policies and plans on a nationwide scale. 65 
In this network of police forces the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation occupies the dominant position. Its 
leadership, as to both theory and practice, is generally 
followed. It sets the general tone of police work at 
all levels. Thus the influence of the Bureau extends 
far beyond the sphere of Federal law enforcement. It 
plays a role in the operation of virtually every police 
force in the nation. 
H. Concentration of Power 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is highly cen-
tralized and highly disciplined. It is run from the top 
and dissent is not tolerated. At the present time it 
seems to be in the grip of a "cult of the Director." 
The Bureau also functions independently and 
secretly. It is officially a part of the Department of 
Justice, b~t for many years the Attorney General has 
had little connection with its operations and virtually 
no control over them. The President is, of course, 
the titular superior; yet he is obviously not in a posi-
tion to exert any supervision. In Congress only the 
subcommittees of the House and Senate appropriation 
committees have an opportunity to question Bureau 
officials or obtain information about its work. For 
many years these subcommittees have done nothing 
but rubber-stamp the Bureau's request for funds, or 
increase them. 60 In short no official of government, 
much less a member of the public, oversees the 
Bureau's policies, reviews its programs, or sees its 
operations from the inside. The Bureau is a virtually 
autonomous institution. 
Finally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is 
highly sensitive to criticism and reacts savagely to 
crush its critics. Martin Luther King, Jr. felt the 
impact. So have others. Sometimes the blows come 
directly from the Bureau; on other occasions from 
its allies. Plainly the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
seeks to achieve the status of untouchability. o 1 
II. Dangers to the Bill of Rights 
The operations of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation pose evident dangers to the system of individual 
rights embodied in our Constitution. These dangers 
are not confined to the way in which the Bureau 
presently performs its functions. They are inherent 
in the very existence of a police force. But the current 
operations of the Bureau serve to focus attention upon 
some of the specific problems which must be met if 
a free and open society is to survive. 
The most common violations of individual rights 
by police-those connected with arrest, detention, 
coercive interrogation, search, and the Iike--can 
easily become a serious problem with a national 
security police force. In ordinary police work, in-
volving the investigation and prosecution of specific 
crimes, infringements of individual rights are more 
likely to come to light and be open to correction by 
the courts, by the press, or by public demand. In the 
case of security police, collecting general intelligence, 
neither the product nor the method may be subject 
to judicial or public scrutiny. Thus the type of illegal 
search revealed in the Coplon reports-ransacking 
an apartment without a warrant-would never be 
exposed. Nor, if disclosed, is it open to remedy by 
the individual citizen. Hence the principle of eternal 
vigilance is applicable, even where no visible signs of 
improper practices appear on the surface. 
In the two areas where current Bureau operations 
raise acute problems-electronic surveillance and the 
use of informers-the dangers to individual rights are 
obvious. Wiretapping, bugging and similar methods 
of obtaining information invade the right of privacy, 
constitute a general search, abridge the privilege 
against self-incrimination, lend themselves to black-
mail, are impossible to keep under control, and 
operate as a general inhibition upon political freedom. 
The use of informers and infiltrators infringe the same 
rights and have a specially debilitating effect upon 
freedom of association. 68 
Undoubtedly the most important impact of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation is that it jeopardizes 
the whole system of freedom of expression which is 
the cornerstone of an open society. The philosophy 
and much of the activity of the Bureau is in direct 
conflict with the fundamental principles underlying 
that system. The Bureau's concept of its function, as 
dedicated guardian of the national security, to collect 
general political intelligence, to engage in preventive 
surveillance, to carry on warfare against potentially 
disruptive or dissenting groups, is wholly inconsistent 
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with a system which stipulates that the government 
may not discourage political dissent or efforts to 
achieve social change, so long as the conduct does 
not involve the use of force, violence, or similar illegal 
action. An ideplogy which so singlemindedly rejects 
new ways of thought, is skeptical of the capacity of 
the American people to think for themselves, fears to 
leave any looseness in the structure of law and order, 
and views criticism of the Bureau as Iese majeste is 
in total opposition to a system that seeks to promote 
diversity of opinion, a clash of ideas, and indeed a 
limited degree of conflict within the society. The mag-
nitude of the Bureau's operation, particularly in the 
national security field, makes its influence pervasive 
and creates the danger of an uncontrolled center of 
despotic power. The vast range of persons and or-
ganizations subject to the Bureau's scrutiny, and the 
unconfined scope of its inquiries, create a chilling 
effect quite opposed to our "profound national com-
mitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open."69 
And the very process of investigation itself may 
have effects that are as intrusive and repressive as 
those of totalitarian police. 
It is not only in the performance of its investigating 
function however, that the Federal Bureau of ln-vestigati~n poses a serious threat to our political 
freedoms. The Bureau has become much more than 
a data-collection agency. In its official statements and 
other publications it has had an important influence 
on public attitudes and opinions. Disclosure of ma-
terials in the Bureau files and leakage from those files 
has had a devastating effect upon some citizens, and 
the possibility of it hangs heavy over all citizens. The 
Bureau has it within its power, should its Director or 
some subordinate so desire, to make the life of any 
citizen highly unconifortable, or perhaps unlivable. 
At times it has done so. As an important center of 
power in Washington the Bureau _is in a position t~ 
influence political events in situations where a pohce 
force, like the military, should keep its hands off. The 
building of the Bureau into a smugly independent, 
highly centralized, professional organization raises 
critical issues of the ability of the Administration or 
of Congress to keep it under control. 
The present position of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation in the American political scene thus 
threatens, at best, grave injury to our democratic_ 
institutions. At worst it raises the specter of a police 
state. The search for ways in which these dangers can 
be met is a matter of urgency for all Americans. 
III. Protective Measures: Judicial 
In considering protective measures against the 
threats to our Bill of Rights posed by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, or by any similar security 
police force, it is natural to turn first to our laws and 
legal institutions. This will be done here. But it is well 
to keep in mind throughout that other avenues of 
approach are equally crucial. 
A. Limiting the Statutory Authority of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Strictly to Law Enforcement 
The most important single step which should be 
taken to safeguard the Bill of Rights is to limit the 
statutory authority of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation to the narrow function of assisting directly in 
the enforcement of those Federal Laws over which it 
is given jurisdiction. The significance of such a 
limitation was clearly understood by members of 
Congress at the time the Bureau was created. 70 It 
was reiterated by Attorney General Stone when, in 
reorganizing the Bureau in 1924, he said: 
The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with pol!tical 
or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with 
their conduct and then only with such conduct as is forbidden 
by the laws of the United States. When a police system 
passes beyond these limits, it is danger_ous to the_pr~per ad-
ministration of justice and to human liberty, which 1t should 
be our first concern to cherish. n 
Attorney General Jackson made the same point: 
All that is necessary is to have a national polic.e competent 
to investigate all manner of offenses, and then, m the par~ance 
of the street, it will have enough on enoug~ pe?ple, even 1f 
it does not elect to prosecute them, so that 1t will find no 
opposition to its policies. Even those. who are supposed to 
supervise it are likely to fear it. I believe that ~h~ safe&uard 
of our liberty lies in limiting any national policing or mv:es~ 
tigative organization, first of all to a small number of strictly 
federal offenses, and secondly to nonpolitical ones. 7 2 
Under such an arrangement the function of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation would be confined 
to investigations where there were reasonable grounds 
to believe that a violation of law had or was about to 
occur. The Bureau might also perform other duties, 
such as investigation of an individual under considera-
tion for appointment to Federal office, but such~ 
investigation would be strictly limited to that sub1ect. 
The Bureau would have no authority to collect general 
political intelligence, to pr~pare for possible fu~ure. 
events by infiltrating a political group, or to mamtam 
dossiers except as to persons specifically investigated 
under its limited authority. Its mission to carry on 
general political warfare would be eliminated. 
Cutting back the operations of the Federal Bu~eau 
of Investigation to their 1924 scope could be achieved 
through aotion of the Presid~nt or the Att?rne~ 
General. Or it could be specifically prescribed m 
legislation enacted by Congress. There is a substantial 
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There is no inherent power in the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation or in any executive agency, to carry 
on at will. The Bureau must derive its authority from 
a statute passed by the legislature or, in limited in-
stances, from a constitutional power of the Chief 
Executive. Analysis of the Bureau's statutory authority 
reveals that existing legislation does not contemplate 
or sanction its excursions beyond the area of strict 
law enforcement. 73 The Bureau undertook such an 
expansion by seizing upon statements of the President, 
by stretching its statutory authority beyond recog-
nition, and by sheer usurpation. 
Indeed supporters of the Bureau's present mode of 
operation rest their argument, not on the existence of 
any statutory authority, but upon the inherent powers 
of the President. 7 4 This claim of an authority, how-
ever, seems clearly insufficient. The President does 
have some implied powers to collect information and 
keep himself abreast of events and trends in the 
country. That he possesses any inherent power to 
establish a national security police force, which keeps 
dossiers on millions of citizens, conducts surveillance 
of dissenting political groups, and maintains the whole 
apparatus of a secret police, would appear constitu-
tionally inconceivable. The decision of the Supreme 
Court in the Youngstown Sheet and Tube case, in-
validating President Truman's seizure of the steel 
mills, makes plain that no such Presidential assump-
tion of power is contemplated by our Constitution. 75 
Nor can it be persuasively argued that Congress by 
appropriation of funds for the Bureau has sub silentio 
given consent to the exercise of Bureau powers. In 
the first place, the full sweep of the Bureau's activities 
have never been revealed to Congress, but rather 
concealed from it. More importantly, in an area which 
touches so deeply the right to freedom of expression, 
freedom from unreasonable searches, and other in-
dividual rights protected by the Constitution, an 
inference of this sort would not be lightly drawn. All 
in all it seems most unlikely that the Supreme Court 
would uphold an implied Presidential power to 
maintain a secret police. 
A more difficult problem is that of drawing the line 
between legitimate Bureau powers in law enforcement 
and unauthorized powers of political surveillance. This 
question takes us into constitutional considerations 
and therefore will be discussed at a later point. Mean-
while it should be noted that the Bureau itself has 
always understood the basic distinction between the 
exercise of law enforcement powers and of intelli-
gence-gathering and political-warfare powers. 76 
Indeed the Bureau has consistently confined itself 
to the law enforcement function in the field of civil 
rights. Speaking of the Bureau's operation in this area 
Director Hoover has observed: "Our agents cannot 
be used as instruments for social reform. They are 
law-enforcement agents. Their job is to gather facts 
when there is an indication that a Federal law has 
been violated. " 77 The Bureau has a similar attitude 
toward certain other areas under its jurisdiction. There 
is no re~son why this approach should not be applied 
to the field of national security. 
Any effort to establish the Bureau's existing legal 
authority in court might run into the question of 
whether a private citizen or organization would have 
standing to challenge the Bureau's scope of operation. 
But the courts have been expanding such rights of 
standing in recent years and this problem could 
probably be successfully overcome. In that event there 
seems no reason why a court should not enjoin the 
Bureau from operating beyond the scope of its 
statutory authority and confine it to strictly law 
enforcement functions. 
B. Constitutional Limits on Political Surveillance 
In addition to statutory limits upon the scope of 
Federal Bureau of Investigation activity there are 
important constitutional restrictions. These are ap-
plicable, of course, whether the Bureau is assumed 
to be operating under legislative authority or under 
inherent Presidential authority. The main constitu-
tional limits on the general powers of the Bureau to 
engage in political surveillance derive from the First 
Amendment and the right of privacy. These issues 
may be considered together. 
There can be little doubt that the operations of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in their present 
form, infringe upon rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. The general impact of the Bureau's 
activities upon the system of freedom of expression 
has already been described. The details could be 
spelled out at length. For example, the maintenance 
by the government of a dossier containing the 
political beliefs, opinions, associations and activities 
of a citizen is bound to cause concern, anxiety and 
fear in him and his associates. The content of such 
a file can be held against him in future investigations 
or prosecutions; it can affect his employment and his 
whole career; if disclosed it can subject him to social 
pressures, economic discriminations, and political 
reprisals; it may be the basis of blackmail; it may be 
inaccurate or used out of context. Knowledge that 
the government is watching and recording one's 
political thoughts and moves is, for most people, a 
shattering experience. Only the most resolute remain 
uninhibited. The same sort of chilling effects flow 
from other activities of the Bureau. 
The decisions of the Supreme Court leave no 
room to question that government conduct which 
produces such an impact impairs freedom of expres-
sion. The Court has held that the mere requirement 
that a citizen file a request with the government in 
order to receive "foreign Communist propaganda" 
in the mail abridges rights under the First Amend-
ment; that a law compelling the disclosure of the 
names of author or distributor of a political leaflet 
inhibits First Amendment rights; and that exposure 
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of the membership lists of an organization like the 
NAACP violates the same constitutional guarantee. 78 
In another series of cases the Court has ruled that 
government measures which go beyond the point 
strictly necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose 
and thereby infringe First Amendment rights are 
invalid as overbroad; "less drastic means" must be 
used to accomplish the government's objective.79 
Both lines of cases point clearly to the conclusion 
that much of the Bureau's operation would fall 
within the coverage of the First Amendment. 
On the other hand the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation performs some legitimate functions in a 
legitimate manner. It clearly can be given the basic 
power to investigate violations of valid Federal laws. 
And the nature of the investigatory process is such 
that the Bureau may not always find it easy to foretell 
at the initial stages what information may be relevant 
and what not. Furthermore a police force may 
through patrolling, deploying, or by other means 
seek to prevent as well as punish the commission of 
crime. Likewise it may, in some degree at least, 
develop general information which will enable it to 
carry out its functions more effectively. These activi-
ties may, in a certain sense, have a retarding or 
inhibiting effect upon lawful political conduct. A 
citizen may curtail his political activity in the 
presence of a police officer because he does not know 
exactly how far he can go, or fears that a police 
mistake will be made, or simply decides to stay on the 
safe side of the law. The problem for the court, there-
fore, is to draw the distinction between legitimate 
investigative activity and unlawful invasion of First 
Amendment rights. 
The place at which the court will establish this 
line depends to some extent upon what legal doctrine 
it employs in deciding First Amendment issues. If 
the court adopts the balancing test-a doctrine fre-
quently invoked in comparable situations-it will 
undertake to weigh the government interest in law 
enforcement against the individual and social interest 
in freedom of expression. As an alternative test it has 
been proposed that the government must show a 
sufficient nexus or connection between the particular 
investigatory activity and the needs of law enforce-
ment. A third theory, designed to give fuU protection 
to First Amendment rights, would seek to determine 
whether the predominate effect of the agency's 
conduct was to secure law enforcement or to inhibit 
freedom of expression; in the former event the 
conduct would be legitimate, but in the latter event 
it would be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court 
decisions to date leave unclear which of these 
doctrines, if any, it would apply in this situation. 80 
One cannot therefore predict with any assurance 
what the outcome of a lawsuit would be. Nevertheless 
it seems reasonable to assume that at some point the 
Bureau's mode of operation would be ruled in viola-
tion of the First Amendment. 
The constitutional right of privacy also establishes 
a boundary to political surveillance by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 
in which the right of privacy was first given recognition 
as part of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court held 
the Connecticut birth control statute unconstitutional 
on the ground that it would permit police snooping 
into the privacies of the marital relation. 81 The scope 
of the constitutional right of privacy has not yet 
been fully developed by the courts. Nevertheless the 
doctrine would clearly be applicable to some of the 
operations of the Bureau. Probing into personal 
affairs, shadowing, compiling dossiers, and similar 
practices, where unrelated to specific law enforcement 
needs, are plainly intrusions into privacy. Again, the 
courts have not yet formulated the legal doctrine by 
which to determine when an invasion of privacy 
constitutes a denial of the constitutional right. Very 
likely they would apply a balancing test, in which the 
governmental interest involved is weighed against 
the individual and social interest in privacy. Until 
more decisions are forthcoming the boundaries will 
remain obscure. And in any event they would not 
seem as confining for the Bureau as those imposed 
by the First Amendment, since most political conduct 
is carried on in the public arena. Nevertheless the 
privacy doctrine would not only support the First 
Amendment position at important points but would 
in its own right operate as a significant limiting 
factor. 
Taking the First Amendment and privacy doctrines 
together, it can be persuasively argued that the con-
stitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights preclude 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation from engaging in 
the following kinds of activity: 
(I) Photographing peaceful demonstrators, 
recording license numbers of persons attending a 
meeting, ostentatious surveillance of a public gather-
ing, or similar blanket collection of data on persons 
not engaging in criminal activities. 
(2) Compiling dossiers of political intelligence 
upon persons who are not charged with or reasonably 
suspected of a specific violation of Federal law, or 
who are not candidates for Federal office. 
(3) Making investigations or maintaining political 
surveillance of organizations or groups in the absence 
of a charge of, or reason to suspect, a violation of 
Federal law, or carrying such investigation beyond 
that necessary to dispose of the violation issue. 
( 4) Disclosing material from any dossier or 
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(5) Conducting investigations or other activities 
in such a way as to constitute political harassment 
of the subject, not related to strict law enforcement 
functions. 
. (6) Engaging in political action or expression not 
directly related to the strict performance of law 
enforcement functions. 
The foregoing enumeration undoubtedly does not 
cover all operations of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation that go beyond the bounds of the constitutional 
limitations. Other conduct, as it is revealed in par-
ticular situations, should be added to the list. In 
essence what is proscribed is all activity of the 
Bureau which attempts to deal with national security 
through preventive measures that infringe upon 
rights protected by the First Amendment. It is a 
fundamental principle of the First Amendment that 
~e government may not curtail freedom of expres-
sion as a means of achieving social controls. This is 
what the Bureau has, more and more, attempted to 
do. No agency of the government should wield such 
pow~rs, least of all the security police. Real pre-
vent10n of danger to national security requires 
affirmative measures to solve the underlying prob-
lems, not suppression of movements for redress. 
It is readily admitted that the drawing of a con-
stitutional line between legitimate and illegitimate 
Bureau conduct, just as the drawing of a statutory 
l~ne discussed above, will sometimes pose hard ques-
t10ns. The proliferation process of investigation, 
already noted, is difficult to circumscribe by legal 
rules. Probably the only answer which can be given 
at this time is that the law must develop, as it cus-
~omarily ~oes, ~n a case by case basis. The principle 
1s clear-it has mdeed been recognized by the Bureau 
from the beginning-and the cases falling toward the 
ends of the spectrum are easily dealt with. Actually, 
statutory or judicial application of the rule would 
immediately result in drastic alteration in the 
Bureau's operations. More precise formulations of 
the rule would follow later. 
One crucial point should, however, be emphasized. 
Under the best of circumstances, judicial restraint 
upon Federal Bureau of Investigation practices will 
be only partially effective so long as Federal legisla-
tion exists that imposes sanctions upon political 
conduct which takes the form of expression. This 
legislation includes Federal anti-sedition laws, such 
as the Smith Act and the Internal Security Act; the 
Federal Anti-Riot Act, which penalizes the crossing 
of state lines with intent to "encourage" a riot; and 
the Federal loyalty programs. To the extent that the 
Federal government can penalize expression the 
Bureau can investigate expression. In the final 
analysis, only by confining Federal controls of 
police activity to conduct that amounts to action, 
and allowing expression to be free, will we be able to 
end serious encroachment by the Bureau upon rights 
supposedly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 
In any event, the difficulties in rolling the Bureau 
back to its constitutional boundaries through litiga-
tion should not be underestimated. The courts, like 
all other parts of the government, are reluctant to 
inject themselves into Bureau affairs. Technical 
problems, such as the standing of private parties to 
raise the constitutional issues, will have to be met. 
More important the problems of proof will be 
serious. Once litigation has commenced the usual 
legal rules for obtaining disclosure from the govern-
ment become applicable; in this way some exposure 
of Bureau operations may be obtained. But the very 
sensitive issues of forcing the security police to reveal 
information about their operations are not easily 
solved. 
If the courts reach a decision upholding the con-
stitutional rights of citizens against the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, troublesome questions 
remain with regard to enforcement of the court rulings. 
How can a decree be framed so that it will protect 
the individual without impairing the legitimate 
functions of the Bureau? Equally important, how will 
the parties, the court, or the public know whether 
the Bureau has complied with the court's order? If 
the court requires that certain Bureau records be 
destroyed, or sequestered, how can anyone be 
assured that microfilm copies will not be retained? 
Can the court appoint a receiver or trustee to super-
vise the enforcement of its orders? Plainly only 
vigorous and innovative action on the part of the 
judiciary, such as some courts have applied in the 
enforcement of civil rights orders, will be necessary 
if a judicial solution is to be achieved. 
Lawsuits raising these and other problems, most of 
them aimed at police forces other than the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, are being brought with 
· increasing frequency. This is a promising develop-
ment. It is important that the facts be brought into 
the open and that the evolution of necessary legal 
doctrines begin. Thus far encouraging successes have 
been achieved, but the results are still inconclusive. 
The major questions remain to be resolved. s2 
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C. Constitutional Limitations on the Use of 
Informers 
Federal Bureau of Investigation practices with 
respect to the use of informers are described else-
where. 83 We are concerned here only with the legal 
question of what judicial controls might be available 
to restrain the activities of the Bureau in this area. 
The main constitutional limitations flow from the 
First Amendment, the right of privacy, and the 
Fourth Amendment. There are also potential limita-
tions derived from the law of entrapment. 
1. The First Amendment 
Application of the First Amendment must begin, 
as in the case of general political surveillance, with 
a factual examination of the impact which the use 
of informers, and particularly infiltrators, have upon 
exercise of the right of expression. One such analysis 
suggests that the Bureau's widespread employment 
of informers in its national security operations, and 
its heavy reliance upon their product, seriously 
impair free and open expression, particularly the 
expression of those ideas disfavored by the Bureau. 84 
The effects are the same as those caused by political 
surveillance generally, as described before, but with a 
much more serious impact upon freedom of associa-
tion. The prevalence of informers in a political 
organization is highly disruptive, alters the character 
of the organization, and often leads to its disintegra-
tion. There can be no doubt that an impact of this 
sort infringes upon the rights which the First Amend-
ment seeks to protect. 
The question then becomes whether, under the 
applicable legal doctrine, such an infringement 
violates the constitutional mandate. The Supreme 
Court has never passed upon this issue. It has never 
had a case in which a full factual presentation of 
Federal Bureau of Investigation informer practices, 
and their impact upon freedom of expression, has 
been made to it, and the First Amendment issues 
fully developed. Nor has the law been expounded in 
the decisions of other courts. The Supreme Court 
has held that "the use of secret informers is not 
per se unconstitutional. "85 By the same token some 
uses are unconstitutional. It would seem reasonable 
to conclude that the same basic dividing line should 
be drawn here as in the case of political surveillance 
generally. This would mean that the Bureau may use 
informers only for direct law enforcement activities, 
that is, specific violation of Federal laws, and not for 
the collection of general intelligence data or for 
information relevant only to the prevention of 
events that have not yet taken place. Even if the 
courts refuse to accept this general doctrine, which 
should apply to any method of political surveillance, 
they ought to take special account of the impact on 
the right of association of certain types of informers. 
An informer who is placed by the police within an 
organization or has such a relation with the police 
as to be in effect a government agent surely ought 
not to be permitted to function except in a narrow, 
crime-investigation, capacity. 86 
Efforts to apply these constitutional principles 
through a series of lawsuits challenging the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation's use of informers would 
present the same practical hazards as have been 
noted above. There would, indeed, be some extra 
difficulties. Thus, since informers operate undercover, 
problems of proof would be even more burdensome. 
The task of separating crime investigation from 
political surveillance would be more exacting. 
Nevertheless, it would be important to begin the 
process of ascertaining just where the constitutional 
limits lie. Only time can give the answer. 
2. The Right of Privacy 
The constitutional right of privacy interposes a 
limitation upon the use of informers in the same way 
as it does upon other investigative operations of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. In situations where 
the relationship of the informer to those upon whom 
he is informing remains entirely impersonal, or 
organizational, presumably no issue of the right 
to privacy would arise. But where an informer 
establishes a personal relation with another person, 
representing himself to be a private citizen but 
actually being an agent of the government, one does 
not have to strain hard to view his conduct as a 
governmental invasion of privacy. Whether a court, 
balancing the interests at stake, would consider such 
an intrusion justifiable would probably turn upon the 
nature of the investigation in progress. It would be 
entirely reasonable to hold that where the object of 
the investigation was to ferret out the perpetrator 
of a specific crime the conduct was permissible; 
but where the purpose was the seeking of general 
political intelligence the invasion of privacy was not 
warranted. This analysis leads to the conclusion that 
the right of privacy is applicable in the same general 
circumstances as the First Amendment. 
3. Entrapment 
On its face the concept of entrapment would 
appear to introduce important restrictions upon the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation's use of informers. 
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To the extent that an informer operated as an agent 
provocateur, joining with other persons in political 
activity, or working actively within an organization, 
it would seem that the government itself was in part 
responsible for any illegal conduct in which the 
informer participated. It would then follow that the 
government's use of an informer in this way could 
be enjoined or otherwise prevented, and that the 
government would have waived its right to punish 
anyone for the offense in which its agent joined. 
In actual practice, however, the law of entrapment 
has not functioned in this way. The doctrine has 
never been held to rest on constitutional foundations; 
rather it is considered either a rule of statutory 
interpretation or a rule originated by the courts and 
applied by them as a matter of judicial policy. In 
part for this reason the entrapment doctrine has never 
served as grounds for obtaining an injunction against 
improper use of informers by the police or as grounds 
for a civil remedy against the police for violation of 
individual rights. Entrapment as a legal doctrine 
has been limited in its use to a defense against 
criminal prosecution. Even here its scope and effect 
have been drastically curtailed. 
As a defense to a criminal prosecution the law of 
entrapment has two major drawbacks. In the first 
place, most courts hold that it can be invoked as a 
defense only by admitting the offense charged. Thus it 
is normally used only as a last resort in an otherwise 
hopeless case. Second, the courts have adopted very 
strict rules as to what constitutes entrapment. The 
view accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court 
is that the defense of entrapment is available only 
when "the criminal design originates with the officials 
of the Government, and they implant in the mind of 
an innocent person the disposition to commit the 
alleged offense and induce its commission. "87 Thus 
the offense must be the product of the government 
agent, originated by him and procured by him from 
an otherwise wholly innocent defendent. This opens 
up the opportunity for the prosecution to make an 
"appropriate and searching inquiry into [the de-
fendant's] conduct and predisposition" as bearing 
on his claim of innocence. 88 The result is that the 
defense of entrapment can rarely be proved to the 
satisfaction of a jury and is seldom attempted. 89 
The doctrine of entrapment evolved largely out 
of prosecutions of sumptuary laws-narcotics, 
prostitution and gambling-where active use by the 
police of informers and solicitation was considered 
imperative and where the rights of the defendants 
were submerged under a tide of morality. The law 
should be reconstructed, at least when applied in 
other contexts, to take into account the realities of 
Federal Bureau of Investigation practices in national 
security investigations. The main points at which 
pressure should be exerted to make entrapment law 
more attuned to the protection of individual rights 
in the area of political expression are apparent from 
the previous discussion. 
An important beginning would be to persuade the 
courts to place the law of entrapment in a constitu-
tional framework. Such a foundation could readily 
be found in the Fourth Amendment or in the due 
process clause. The way would then be open for the 
use of the right against entrapment as an affirmative 
instrument to enjoin improper police practices or 
to penalize police who engage in them. Another sig-
nificant reform would be to allow the claim of 
entrapment as an alternative defense, not dependent 
upon an admission of guilt. This would probably 
require-a change justified also on other grounds-a 
pre-trial determination by the court of whether 
entrapment had in fact occurred. A further change 
would be to impose upon the police the obligation 
to establish probable cause that a law violation was 
taking place as a condition of planting an informer 
in an organization or group. This would have the 
advantage of eliminating the use of informers 
altogether except in situations subject to check by 
the courts, rather than trying to pick up the pieces 
after the damage had occurred. 
Most important of all would be the development 
of a new definition of entrapment. A suggestion of 
the lines this reformulation of the concept might take 
appears in the minority position of the Supreme 
Court in its entrapment decisions. According to this 
view the basic question should be "whether the 
police conduct revealed in the particular case falls 
below standards ... for the proper use of govern-
mental power."90 The test would then be whether 
the government agent went beyond the proper degree 
of encouragement. The acceptance of such a theory 
would go far to make entrapment doctrine a major 
obstacle to the excesses of the Bureau in using 
informers in the national security field. 
4. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment provides that the "right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated." One of its 
primary purposes, as revealed by both English and 
American history, was to protect the right of political 
opposition against unwarranted intrusions by official 
authority. Moreover, the employment of informers 
and infiltrators has always been recognized as "dirty 
business": informers are likely to be unsavory 
characters; the product of their labors-the informer's 
tale-must be viewed with distrust; the practice 
requires the government to engage in gross decep-
tions in dealing with its citizens; and the whole 
process is associated with a totalitarian type of 
secret police. In view of this background one would 
expect the Fourth Amendment to be an important 
factor in curbing the use of informers in political 
surveillance. It is surprising to find that such is not 
the case. On the contrary, as presently interpreted 
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and applied, the Fourth Amendment imposes very 
little restriction upon Federal Bureau of Investigation 
practices in this regard.91 
The legal issues that the courts must consider in 
dealing with the Fourth Amendment revolve around 
three major problems. First, does the government's 
action that is challenged constitute a "search" or 
"seizure"; that is to say, is the Fourth Amendment 
applicable at all? Second, if the conduct falls within 
the terms of rt.he Amendment, was the search or 
seizure "unreasonable"? If so, the government is 
violating the constitutional right. Third, if the search 
or seizure would be reasonable, what procedures are 
required; is a warrant necessary and upon what basis 
should it be issued? The development of Fourth 
Amendment law with respect to informers has been 
hung up on the first problem. 
In its first major decision on the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment the Supreme Court gave the 
constitutional mandate a broad application. Boyd v. 
United States, decided in 1886, held that a legal 
proceeding to compel the production of books and 
papers violated both the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments. The Fourth Amendment, said.the Court, 
applied to "all invasions on the part of the govern-
ment and its employes of the sanctity of a man's 
home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking 
of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers, that 
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the 
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property."92 
Later decisions, however, drastically curtailed the 
Fourth Amendment's application. Thus in Olmstead 
v. United States the Court ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment was limited to the seizure of tangible 
objects and hence did not apply to wiretapping. 93 
And in subsequent cases, mostly involving other 
forms of electronic surveillance, the Court majority 
came to accept a property theory of the Fourth 
Amendment. In that view only those government 
intrusions which infringed upon lawfully held 
property were within the coverage of the Amend-
ment. 94 Such a position left no room for application 
of the Fourth Amendment to the use of informers 
(apart from a situation where the informer's methods 
involved a trespass upon property) and in three cases 
in 1966 the Court in effect took this position. 95 
Meanwhile the property theory of the Fourth 
Amendment was breaking down and in two cases 
decided in 1961-Berger v. New York and Katz v. 
United States-the position was abandoned. 96 The 
Berger and Katz cases, overruling Olmstead, held 
that the Fourth Amendment did apply to wiretapping 
and other forms of electronic surveillance, regardless 
of whether trespass or other invasion of physical 
property had occurred. At this point the Supreme 
Court seemed on the verge of returning to the Boyd 
theory-that any intrusion by the government upon 
personal security and liberty would be subject to the 
Fourth Amendment. That hope was dashed in 
White v. United States when the Court reaffirmed 
its position that the activities of an informer (using 
a concealed radio transmitter) were not within the 
scope of Fourth Amendment limitations. 97 The 
Supreme Court has never squarely faced the question, 
however, whether·the Fourth Amendment applies to 
tlie use of informers for political surveillance. 
The current position of the Supreme Court seems 
wholly inconsistent with the original purpose and 
present function of the Fourth Amendment. A gov-
ernment informer, acting as a government agent to 
obtain information from unsuspecting citizens, is 
surely engaged in a search and a seizure. His conduct 
plainly constitutes an intrusion by the government 
into the personal privacy and liberty of those upon 
whom he reports. The fact that the information is 
obtained by deception rather than by forceful entry 
would not seem to be a decisive factor. The whole 
process violates the basic right the Fourth Amend-
ment was designed to protect-the right to be let 
alone. Moreover, it seriously interferes with the right 
of political opposition: dissenting activities cannot 
be carried on with the government looking over the 
citizen's shoulder. The Supreme Court is undoubtedly 
reluctant for practical reasons to place controls over 
the ancient police practice of employing informers. 
The record of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
to date, however, and the possibility of worse abuse 
in the future, make it imperative that the Court 
return to the original premises of the Fourth Amend-
ment and make that guarantee applicable to the use 
of government informers, at least in the area of 
national security investigators. 98 
Once the informer system is brought under the 
control of the Fourth Amendment, other problems 
could be faced and resolved. The next issue would 
be for the courts to determine what kinds of informer 
practices constitute an "unreasonable" search or 
seizure and so are totally forbidden. Two points of 
reference in drawing the line between "reasonable" 
and "unreasonable" are important: First, for reasons 
already stated, the use of informers for the collection 
of general political intelligence or data pertaining 
to prevention of possible political offenses in the 
future, would fall into the category of an "unreason-
able" search and seizure. Use in direct crime 
investigation, on the other hand, would be prima facie 
reasonable. Here the line is drawn in the same place 
as in the application of First Amendment and 
privacy doctrines. Second, the delineation between 
unreasonable and reasonable would be marked by 
various factors relating to the methods used. The 
degree to which the government took the initiative 
in placing the informer, the kind of controls the 
government exercised over the informer, the manner 
in which the informer obtained information, and 
especially the extent to which the informer par-
ticipated in the activities of the persons or organiza-
tions he was assigned to watch, are some of the 
considerations upon which such a determination 
would be based. 
There are obvious difficulties in compelling the 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation, or any police 
agency, to adhere to the rules that the courts adopt. 
Success in securing compliance would depend upon 
the vigor with which the courts and the public 
pressed the issues. It should be noted, however, that 
in situations where information obtained by inform-
ers was used in a criminal prosecution the rule 
requiring exclusion of illegally seized evidence 
would operate, in some degree, as an enforcement 
device. 
Finally, in those cases where the use of informers 
would not constitute an "unreasonable" search or 
seizure, important questions of procedure would 
arise. Under the Fourth Amendment a warrant 
would be mandatory, at least in all but exceptional 
situations, before the government could employ an 
informer. This would require the government to 
make a showing of "probable cause", supported by 
oath, and to "particularly" describe the scope of the 
informer's activities and the nature of information he 
was to obtain. The warrant procedure could also be 
used to compel a statement of the duration of the 
operation and the kind of deception contemplated. 
Again, there are many practical problems. Ex-
perience has shown that the procedures for issuing 
a warrant may become wholly formalized, that the 
demonstration of probable cause may be minimal, 
and that the role of the judicial officer may be merely 
to rubber-stamp the whole process. Under such 
circumstances the requirement of a warrant does not 
afford much protection. There are signs, however, that 
the Supreme Court will insist more rigorously upon 
the duty of the judicial officer to make a more 
knowledgeable decision in warrant cases. Hence the 
requirement of judicial supervision could become 
a more useful control. Furthermore, the warrant 
procedure would produce a better record than we 
now have of how much and where the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation uses the informer system. 
D. Conclusions 
The conclusion to be drawn from this survey is that 
our judicial system is capable of affording a much 
more effective protection than it does now against 
infringements of the Bill of Rights by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and other police agencies. 
The fundamental principles embodied in the Bill of 
Rights were designed to safeguard the citizen against 
the very dangers now confronting us. The character 
and magnitude of the problems have changed, how-
ever, and the courts have failed to adapt the ancient 
principles to the new conditions. Particularly, they 
have failed to recognize the need for special ap-
plication of the constitutional guarantees against the 
threats which have grown out of the mass of restrictive 
measures imposed by the government in the name of 
"national security". Unless the courts focus more 
attention upon bringing the Bill of Rights up to date 
in this area, judicial protection against improper 
practices of the Bureau will remain weak. 
IV. Protective Measures: Legislative and Executive 
The protective measures afforded by the judicial 
system cannot, of course, be the sole reliance in at-
tempting to meet the dangers posed by a national 
security police to democratic institutions. The role 
which can be played by legal principles and legal 
institutions is limited in itself and ineffective without 
support from the whole community. It is therefore 
necessary to look to other institutions and other 
methods as well. 
There are two prime elements in undertaking to 
formulate additional measures of control. One is the 
overriding importance of access to information about 
Federal Bureau of Investigation operations. The other 
is the development of techniques for scrutiny and 
supervision of those operations. 
Access to information is essential for any control 
because there is no other way by which the issues can 
be known, understood, confronted, and solved. There 
are, of course, many difficulties. A police force, 
especially a security police force, cannot operate 
altogether in the open. Yet this fact simply makes 
the problem harder; it does not lessen its significance. 
Uncontrollable strength and power grow out of 
secrecy. Not only does concealment permit and 
encourage abuses of authority and prevent rectifi-
cation, but it feeds the rumors, ignorance, and myth-
making which envelop a security police. Secrecy 
permits the police force to play upon fear, manipulate 
public opinion, and further aggrandize its power. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation would not be the 
institution it is today except for its ability to conceal 
what it does. Visibility in its operations is crucial to 
any reform. 
Scrutiny and supervision by outside agencies are 
equally important. James Madison and the founding 
fathers rested their hopes of an open society on a 
system of checks and balances, and history has con-
firmed their theories. Yet the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation is virtually unique in its isolation and 
independence. It is a self-perpetuating, ingrown 
institution shielded from any supervision and even 
from criticism. Such a state of affairs, we should have 
learned by now, cannot be tolerated within a free 
nation. 
In seeking these objectives of greater visibility and 
greater supervision it should be possible to rely to 
some extent upon existing institutions. The President 
and the Attorney General owe an obligation to the 
American people to establish control over the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. Congress, through its 
appropriation committees, judiciary committees, and 
special investigating committees, should begin to 
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treat the Bureau like any other agency in the executive 
branch. And the Bureau itself should be reshaped in 
ways that have been proposed, not the least of which 
is to have as its Director a person who is not by 
profession a policeman.99 
But it seems clear that this will not be enough. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation is not any ordinary 
institution, and it has not reached its present in-
trenched position by accident or by the work of 
one man. There is need for some special machinery 
designed to meet the special problem of controlling 
a security police force. The form this machinery 
should take grows out of two basic considerations. 
First, a security police can never be controlled without 
mobilizing power outside the governmental apparatus. 
The government is so obsessed with its law and order 
function, so ridden with bureaucratic loyalties, so 
vulnerable to its.own investigators, that it cannot be 
trusted to curb its police force. The way must be 
shown by independent forces in the community who 
represent the long-range aspirations of the society and 
are less committed to the immediate fortunes of the 
administration in power. Second, individual citizens 
must have a direct, assured method, separate from 
the cumbersome judicial process, for airing complaints 
that the Bureau has abused its authority. 
These two requirements are not met by the same 
kind of machinery. The first calls for a Board of 
Overseers, composed of distinguished private citizens 
who are committed to the principles of an open 
society and see the problems in a different way from 
the Bureau and the government. Such a Board would 
have access to all Bureau records and activities. It 
would have the function of reviewing the Bureau's 
policies, scrutinizing its programs, and inspecting its 
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